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Abstract 
 
Over the past several decades, relationality or relationships in general have become a 
topic of interest within the field of psychology. New relational variations of theories are 
developed alongside prior positivist positions, common factors are being explored scientifically 
to identify the relational characteristics that make clinicians effective, relational implications of 
neurodevelopment abound, and various pragmatic relational terminologies are vying for 
adherents. Shults (2003) proposed that a broader philosophical turn to relationality is occurring 
in contemporary culture, and examined it primarily within philosophy and theology. Historically, 
the relationship between philosophy and psychology has been largely severed since psychology 
sought to define itself separately as a scientific discipline in the late nineteenth century. Since 
that time, psychology has embraced a scientific epistemology that largely ignores ontological 
considerations.  
The central thesis of this paper is that the turn to relationality occurring in the field of 
psychology involves 2 distinct veins that rely on very different philosophical and anthropological 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     iv 
 
assumptions. Each of these ultimately has implications for the integration of psychology and 
Christianity. One vein attributes relationships secondary status to the identity and substance of 
the individual; this vein relies on an individual analogy of personhood. The other vein seeks to 
balance relations and substances as simultaneous constituting factors in the identity of 
individuals; this second vein relies on a social analogy of personhood.  
The philosophical inheritance of the relational turn was examined in the context of the 
outgrowth of Continental forms of philosophy in order to clearly distinguish both relational veins. 
The resulting philosophical and anthropological assumptions of these veins were further 
expanded and explored within various disciplines including theology, psychology, and the 
integration of these two disciplines.  
Ultimately, the task of integration is enriched as relational ontological considerations 
encourage increased developmental sensitivity to identity formation, emphasis on models of 
process, consideration of the role of the Holy Spirit, expansion of sociocultural models, and a 
defining value for human agency. 
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Chapter 1
 
Introduction 
 
Shults (2003), a theologian and philosopher, proposed that a re-turn to relationality is 
currently occurring in philosophy and theology, which has significant implications for the social 
sciences as well. The focus on relationality is considered to be a reclaiming and emphasizing of 
prior existing values that have been present in Christian history at least since the patristic era.  
Interest in relationality within the field of psychology has exponentially grown within the 
past few decades. It is marked by a general fascination with the effects of relationships and social 
influences on individuals that permeates many theoretical perspectives (Held, 2007; Kirschner & 
Martin, 2010). It is also apparent in the focus on scientific research concerning the common 
factors that promote therapist effectiveness, especially in regards to the development of the 
therapeutic relationship (Duncan, Miller, Wampold, & Hubble, 2009; Norcross, 2002). The 
central thesis of this paper is that a turn to relationality is occurring in the field of psychology in 
two distinct veins that rely on very different anthropological assumptions, which ultimately have 
significant implications for the integration of psychology and Christianity. 
Following Shults’ (2003) lead, the examination of relationality in psychology will heavily 
rely upon philosophical considerations, which historically have not been widely accepted within 
the discipline of psychology. Section one will focus on the philosophical inheritance of 
contemporary relational values by tracing the development of Continental and Analytic traditions 
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and their related anthropological and metaphysical assumptions. Continental philosophy will 
then be defined and emphasized as many of the assumptions inherent to the relational turn have 
developed within this broad philosophical canopy. 
Chapter 2 will expand these anthropological and metaphysical assumptions into 
contemporary theology and the emphasis since World War II on relational values in Trinitarian 
theology. Two distinct theological anthropologies can be seen to have coexisted since this time, 
which have direct connections with the philosophical inheritance discussed in the first section of 
this paper (Grenz, 2001; Shults, 2003). One is an individual analogy of personhood, while the 
other is a social analogy of personhood.  
Chapter 3 will trace the two relational veins, an individual analogy and a social analogy, 
into the field of psychology in order to clearly illuminate possible contributing factors to the 
relational turn and its impact on the field of psychology. 
The fourth and final chapters will continue to trace the social analogy of personhood and 
ontological relational values into current formulations of imago Dei. This allows for the 
examination of the potential impact of the relational turn on the integration of psychology and 
Christianity.  
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Chapter 2
 
Philosophical Inheritance 
 
 In the 1880s, American experimental psychologists attempted to establish the new 
experimental science of psychology in philosophy departments (Benjamin, 2007). Mental 
philosophy or an empirical science of the mind quickly began to develop alongside the new 
experimental psychology in this unique intellectual environment. The new psychologists grew to 
reject the developing mental philosophy because it relied too heavily on metaphysical 
speculation. As a result, psychology developed into a distinct field by separating itself from 
many, if not all, of its philosophical roots. Simultaneously, psychology was also attempting to 
define and market itself as a laboratory science distinct from prior pseudo-psychologies such as 
mesmerism, mental healing, physiognomy, and spiritualism (Benjamin & Baker, 2004). At the 
turn of the nineteenth century, science gradually became the most definitive and credible source 
of knowledge. Since then the relationship between philosophy and psychology has remained 
largely severed (Schrag, 1990).  
 Within psychology three very different approaches to human behavior have been posited 
to have grown out of the late nineteenth century as psychology was divorcing itself from 
philosophy, while simultaneously pursuing a scientific identity (Kockelmans, 1990). These three 
approaches to human behavior were experimental psychology, verstehende psychology, and 
introspective psychology. Descendants of these three approaches can be found in current 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     4 
 
categories of empirical psychology, hermeneutic psychology, and phenomenological psychology 
(Bouchard, 1991). A shift from hermeneutic philosophies of science to an empirical philosophy 
of science occurred in the 1920’s as behaviorism became the focus of psychological inquiry 
(Neimeyer & Raskin, 2001). Over the past century, attention has largely been placed on 
experimental psychology, while hermeneutic and phenomenological psychologies have been 
confined to specific traditions that have been heavily influenced by the Continental tradition in 
philosophy.  
 The Continental tradition in philosophy has contributed a significant philosophical 
inheritance to contemporary relational values that are becoming popular within psychology and 
across other diverse disciplines. The birth of Continental philosophy, its current relationship with 
the dominant form of Analytic philosophy, and a broader movement from epistemological to 
ontological considerations within both traditions of contemporary philosophy will prove crucial 
to the examination of the current re-emergence and interest in relationality within the field of 
psychology, and the ramifications it has for the integration of psychology and Christianity. 
Enlightenment  
 The Enlightenment was firmly established by the eighteenth century, and is often 
described as comprising three major components (Brinton, 1967). The first and most important 
involved a wholehearted commitment to reason. Reason became a means of accessing 
knowledge, the defining feature of intelligence, and the liberator from prior unqualified 
commitments (e.g., superstitious beliefs and unexamined traditions). The second component- 
nature and the natural world- became valued as the most primary object of study and the most 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     5 
 
credible source of knowledge. Finally, the third was expressed in the belief in progress in all 
human endeavors.  
 Many contend that although the Enlightenment produced a value for reason and 
rationalism the subsequent impact on modernity is more accurately conceived as two competing 
traditions. The dominant tradition and most widely acknowledged definition of the 
Enlightenment was the high value its proponents placed on optimistic scientific or empirical 
rationalism. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, counter-Enlightenment 
proponents, who formed the second rational enlightenment tradition, took up a humanistic focus 
in response to the turn to scientific or empirical rationalism. This tradition valued metaphysical 
rationalism (e.g., romanticism). 
 Dupre (2004) posited that the Enlightenment also marked a significant anthropological 
shift in the conception of the modern self as an individual. Prior to the Enlightenment, persons 
found their identity in the larger universe and created order, which placed emphasis on their 
station in life or their hierarchical status in society. The valuing of the individual in the 
Enlightenment allowed persons to conceive of themselves and others in new ways (Mansfield, 
2000). With the dominant value in rationalism, traditional credence in the soul gave way to the 
influence of the human will and intellect, which simultaneously paralleled a general cultural 
movement away from religious allegiances to the explanatory power of scientific, objective 
personal knowledge, and the search for related causal explanations. In fact, fields such as 
anthropology, modern history, modern philosophy, natural sciences, and human sciences were all 
born out of this shift to the objective vantage point of the individual (Dupre, 2004). 
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 Both competing strands of the Enlightenment, empirical and metaphysical rationalism, 
are often viewed as relying on a Cartesian conception of the individual self, although they 
manifested this assumption in very different ways. The dominant strand of scientific rationalism 
relies upon a rational, individual and autonomous self that is able to become free through the use 
of reason and empirical investigation. In other words, the objectification or abstraction of the self 
from both external forces and internal forces allows self-mastery to occur (Cushman, 1995).  
The second competing strand, metaphysical rationalism, still relies on an individual and 
autonomous self, but posits that the self emerges from self-expression rather than self-mastery, 
thus yielding a more particular rather than universal self. This form of self is often called the 
autobiographical self, because of its inward focus on unique individuality (Cushman, 1995).  
Continental vs. Analytic 
 In the eighteenth century, an interest in language emerged from the focus on individual 
reasoning and resulted in forms of writing such as the novel and autobiographies (Dupre, 2004). 
By the early twentieth century, a “linguistic turn” propelled by the precision of scientific 
methods was occurring in philosophy that began to challenge the epistemological emphasis that 
had dominated the discipline for two centuries (Rosen, 2001). Bohman, Hiley, and Shusterman 
(1991) stated, “The linguistic turn has been characterized by preoccupations with the structure of 
language, word-world relationships, and the analysis of meaning” (p. 1). Early in the twentieth 
century, the growing gap between knowledge and wisdom became clearly visible in a rift within 
professional philosophy as two traditions took shape (Critchley, 2001). Continental philosophy is 
influenced by metaphysical rationalism and Analytic philosophy by the dominant empirical 
rationalism. Both Continental and Analytic traditions recognized the importance of language and 
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its broad influence on understanding and meaning, and both took linguistic turns in their own 
ways. These differing linguistic commitments are partially what brought the two opposing 
traditions into clear view early in the twentieth century. 
 There has been little consensus on how to clearly define and distinguish these two 
opposing traditions. The most typical distinction is one of geography, which aligns British and 
Anglo-American sects (i.e., Analytic) against other largely French and German inspired ones 
(i.e., Continental) on the mainland of Europe. In many regards, Analytic varieties of philosophy 
have largely taken hold in both British and American contexts, resulting in the current and 
dominant form of philosophical discourse in both countries. 
 Besides geography, the second most common distinction is methodological 
commitments: Empirical-scientific and hermeneutic-romantic (Critchley, 2001). Analytic 
philosophy uses a science-like methodology that values clear and precisely structured logic, 
whereas Continental traditions have largely taken on a much more literary methodology (Biletzki, 
2001). This focus on literary methodology has spawned a reliance on hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics refers to the study of interpretation, which originally developed as a field of study 
of religious and sacred texts over 300 years ago.  
 Many believe that both geographical and methodological distinctions between Analytic 
and Continental traditions are reductionistic, and are not an accurate representation of the 
diversification of the two sides over the past century (e.g., Critchley & Schroeder, 1998; Glock, 
2008; Levy, 2003). It should also be noted that many resist aligning themselves with either 
tradition, and in fact are offering valuable work from outside these two positions (Levy, 2003). 
Critchley and Schroeder (1998) posited, “Both Continental and Analytic philosophy are, to a 
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great extent, sectarian self-descriptions of philosophy that are the lamentable consequence of the 
professionalization of the discipline” (p. 14).  
Analytic philosophy has successfully modeled itself on the physical sciences (Levy, 
2003), which has allowed the proliferation of problem solving within clear and specific 
subdisciplines (e.g., theory of mind, cognitive science, philosophy of science). Levy (2003) 
contended that Continental philosophy does not adhere to a specific scientific methodology, 
which accounts for several unique characteristics including a general lack of subdiscipline 
specialization, less interest in specific problem solving focuses, and the proliferation of countless 
schools of thought.  
Continental Philosophy 
Various theoretical branches within psychology were heavily influenced by Continental 
thought and values including phenomenology, existentialism, humanism, client centered theory, 
psychoanalysis, and various forms of constructivism. Continental philosophy is often associated 
with, if not mistaken for, the phenomenological school, which is a major school and influence 
within the Continental tradition (Sokolowski, 2000). Viewing the field of philosophy more 
broadly is helpful in understanding Continental parameters. There are a number of subdivisions 
within philosophy such as logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ethics, etc., 
and Continental philosophy does not neatly fit into any of these frameworks. In many ways, 
Continental philosophy cuts across all of them (Critchley & Schroeder, 1998). Various 
intellectual traditions can be seen to have influenced the broad canopy of Continental 
philosophies, most stemming from metaphysical rationalist or counter-Enlightenment traditions, 
although there tend to be general themes that unite them. 
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 One such theme is a strong consciousness of history (Critchley & Schroeder, 1998). 
Much of the focus of the Continental tradition is on practice due to its value for history and the 
need for accurate interpretation of the methodologies of philosophy in light of contextual 
implications such as history, culture, society, etc. (Glock, 1998).  
 Another theme in Continental philosophies, in part due to the practical focus of historical 
interpretive considerations, is the actual use of philosophy as a vehicle for social commentary 
and critique (Critchley & Schroeder, 1998). This functional emphasis has an emancipatory intent 
that critiques present conditions for the purpose of designating a crisis that must be resolved. 
Critchley & Schroeder (1998) stated: 
The fact that philosophy in the Continental tradition can be said to respond to a sense of 
crisis in modernity and indeed tries to produce crisis insofar as it endeavors to awaken a 
critical consciousness of the present, perhaps also goes some way to explaining its most 
salient and dramatic difference from analytic philosophy, namely its anti-scientism (an 
attitude that is, of course, far from being anti-scientific). (p. 12) 
 Critchley (2001) proposed a simple model for conceptualizing philosophy in the 
Continental tradition. It begins with critique, is followed by praxis, and ends with emancipation. 
By no means is there a general consensus within Continental philosophy regarding what should 
be the focus of critical reflection, and in fact, it varies dramatically between different theorists 
and schools. Critique of current conditions is what actually grounds the practice of philosophy in 
a real and meaningful way for Continental philosophers. Critchley stated, “The real crisis would 
be a situation where crisis was not recognized. In such a world, philosophy would have no 
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purpose, other than as a historical curiosity, an intellectual distraction, or a technical means of 
sharpening one’s common sense” (p. 73).  
 Continental theorists and their values for historiography, emancipation, and anti-
scientism can be recognized by their work in philosophical hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
semiotics, critical theory, feminism, psychoanalysis, structuralism, deconstructionism, 
poststructuralism, and postmodernism (Daniel, 2005). It becomes obvious from these categories 
that Continental theorists are drawn to political and social philosophy (Cooper, 1994; Levy, 
2003). Continental philosophy has tended to constitute a broader range of metaphysical outlooks 
than Analytic philosophy (Atkins, 2005; Williams, 1990).  
 The current focus of both Analytic and Continental traditions is synonymous with 
contemporary philosophy in general, which is primarily concerned with language, discourse, 
hermeneutics, and texts rather than cosmological, teleological, or even metaphysical questions 
(Rosen, 2001). Miller (1992) described contemporary philosophy by stating, “Philosophy is 
primarily seen as either an extension of science, as in philosophy of science, or to be done in a 
scientific or analytical manner” (p. 17). 
Interpretive/Ontological Turn 
 The linguistic turn of the early twentieth century contributed an air of skepticism to the 
prior unquestioned foundations of knowledge and the knowing subject. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, this skepticism has further been called into question during a period of rapid 
globalization, increased industrial and technological growth, mass human migrations from rural 
to urban settings, and an explosion of instant international communication. These factors have 
contributed to rapid movement beyond the initial influence of the linguistic turn in philosophy to 
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the subsequent realization that a constricted focus on language, especially from a strictly Anglo-
American perspective, cannot adequately account for the rapid expansion and diversification of 
positions and meanings that globalization has brought to the forefront of the dialogue.  
This unsettling of the foundations of knowledge is clearly visible in a new emphasis on 
interpretation, which has been called the interpretive turn (Bohman et al., 1991; Frie, 2010). In 
many regards, theory within philosophy has come to be considered synonymous with 
interpretation or invention (Rosen, 2001). Rosen stated: 
Analysts and continentals alike are attracted to notions of invention rather than 
discovery, interpretation rather than contemplation or intuition, the celebration of 
difference rather than identity or sameness, and freedom rather than submission to 
the reification and suppression of necessity. (p. 347) 
 The influence of other interpretive disciplines that implement various theories and 
methodologies of interpretation, such as cultural anthropology, jurisprudence, historiography, 
literary criticism, religion, and feminist theory, have also had an impact on the turn beyond 
linguistics to interpretation (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Many fields since the 1970s 
have experienced this interpretive phenomenon, as subspecialties have developed alongside more 
traditional positivist variations. Cultural or social anthropology is one example of this, as it 
developed outside of the typical three categories of anthropology: Archeological, linguistic, and 
biological/physical. Held (2007) stated: 
In making the interpretive turn, these scholars take the (contextualized) interpretive or 
meaning-making powers and acts of human agents to be fundamental both to human 
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(social and psychological) existence (an ontological matter) and to inquiry about that 
existence (an epistemological matter). (p. 6)  
 The interpretive turn has involved a movement away from solely epistemological 
considerations to emphasizing inherent, although often unexamined, ontological assumptions. 
There are certainly those who in making or claiming this turn support more extreme positions of 
epistemological relativism, although in actuality, a majority of them do not. Many have used the 
term ontological turn synonymously with the interpretive turn (Held, 2007). This definition 
speaks to the overall neglect of broader ontological considerations in the wake of Western 
philosophy’s commitment to scientific methodology, and ultimately, epistemological values. 
Many supporters of the ontological/interpretive turn value a mutual reciprocity between 
epistemology and ontology and wish to expand the current emphasis on substance metaphysics 
to broadly encompass greater contextual influences and processes (Held, 1995; 2007).  
 Developments in the field of hermeneutics within Continental philosophy is one of the 
areas that most clearly evidences this transition from epistemological to ontological 
considerations, which is a driving force in the interpretive turn.  
History of Hermeneutics 
The term hermeneutics first came into usage during the Protestant Reformation following 
the Council of Trent (1545–1563) (Richardson et al., 1999). By the seventeenth century it was 
considered an adjunct discipline to theology with its own interpretive methodology for 
determining the meaning of scripture in light of church authority and tradition (Orange, 2011). 
Two major transitions are typically considered of central importance within its 300-year history 
(Richardson et al., 1999; Ricoeur, 1981).  
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The first transition occurred in the mid-nineteenth century and involved moving from 
local forms of theological and sacred text interpretation, which can be traced back to Stoics and 
church fathers, to the idea of a general methodological hermeneutics able to produce a universal 
form of interpretation applicable to every form of human discourse (Richardson et al., 1999). 
Fredrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), a theologian, is considered to be one of the first to 
propose such a hermeneutic methodology (Shults, 2003). His methodology attempted to 
reconstruct the original intent of the author of a given literary work, which involved both 
grammatical and psychological considerations. A central assumption of Schleiermacher’s 
methodology was the Romantic belief in an inner mental domain that was distinct from outer 
expression (Shults, 2003). 
A later hermeneutical theorist, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), helped to transition the 
field into its contemporary emphasis by focusing on the outer expression that Schleiermacher 
considered of secondary importance (Richardson et al., 1999). Dilthey’s methodology sought to 
comprehend not just speech acts, but more universal human phenomena such as actions, works 
of art, historical events, and social movements. He espoused a methodological dualism that 
favored distinct scientific methods; the natural order was considered more conducive to causal 
explanations, while the study of humans was more descriptive because of its inability to produce 
truths independent from contextual influences (Shults, 2003). His consideration of the human 
sciences contributed to what is now known as the hermeneutic circle, which highlighted the 
process of understanding a text through the reciprocity of whole to individual parts and 
individual parts to the whole. Although Dilthey provided the foundation for later ontological 
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considerations in the field of hermeneutics, he still largely favored an epistemological emphasis 
like Schleiermacher that sought to outline specific methodologies of interpretation.  
The second transition within the history of hermeneutics began to occur at the beginning 
of the twentieth century and entailed moving from a primarily epistemological or methodological 
focus to current ontological trends (Richardson et al., 1999). Martin Heidegger is credited with 
achieving this movement from epistemological to ontological hermeneutics, which sought to 
consider the mode of being for humans or the self-interpretation of human existence (Sokolowski, 
2000). Richardson et al. (1999) stated: 
The result was a shift from seeing hermeneutics as primarily epistemological or 
methodological, where the aim is to develop an art or technique of interpretation, to 
today’s ontological hermeneutics, which aims to clarify the being of the entities that 
interpret and understand, namely, ourselves. (p. 200)  
Three different philosophical traditions have turned to a variety of contemporary versions 
of hermeneutics during the 1970s and early 1980s: Anti-positivist analytic philosophers 
influenced by Wittgenstein’s later writings, the Frankfurt school of German philosophy 
influenced by Habermas, and ontological hermeneutics or philosophical hermeneutics influenced 
by Gadamer (Miller, 1992). In the past century, developments within hermeneutics have 
influenced many fields including archaeology, literature, critical theory, architecture, 
international relations, law, psychology, theology, and sociology (Orange, 2009; 2011).  
Self-Interpretation of human existence is the central preoccupation of the 
interpretive/ontological turn, which entailed a significant anthropological shift over prior modern 
conceptions. It should be noted that not all have taken this turn in philosophy, and many would 
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even contend that this turn is either imperceptible or entirely unwelcome. Understanding these 
philosophical developments helps to illuminate the shift in anthropological focus that undergirds 
much of the current re-emergence and interest in relationality within the field of psychology. 
This anthropological shift is also quite visible within theology, which will be the focus of the 
next section. 
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Chapter 3
 
Philosophical Turn to Relationality 
 
 Shults’ (2003) description of a recent emphasis on relational concepts in philosophy and 
theology is not altogether new for theology or for philosophy, and should actually be considered 
a re-turn to these values. He stated, “The novelty is a new emphasis on the insertion of the 
category of relation into the heart of metaphysical discourse” (p.12). Substance has classically 
been privileged over relation as an explanatory category in metaphysics. Many are also 
contending that a general resurgence and interest in metaphysics is also occurring in 
contemporary philosophy (Rescher, 1997; Stroll, 2009). This is in part due to an emphasis on 
systematic and integrative philosophy at a collective level, and a changing attitude towards the 
relationship between science and metaphysics as being more compatible. Reconceptualizations 
of anthropological values are closely related to this shift.  
Anthropological Turn 
 Analytic and Continental traditions within the modern age, motivated by their distinct 
scientific epistemological and ontological emphases, have served to propagate very different 
conceptions of personhood. Analytic philosophy with its rational emphasis and scientific 
commitments has largely relied upon a conception of the self-mastering, individual, rational self 
as the basis of personal identity as well as the discipline’s primary unit of study (Cushman, 1995).  
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 Continental philosophy with its broad range of metaphysical schools, humanistic 
emphasis, lack of methodological commitments, and value for sociocultural and historical 
influences has provided a unique environment for the proliferation of the individual, self-
expressive self as well as other diverse variations (Frie, 2003). Mansfield (2000) contended that 
theories of the self within the Continental tradition fall into two broad camps. Those that posit 
subjectivity as a definable and measurable entity and those that believe subjectivity imprisons 
persons to the misguided ideology that selfhood is the most precious possession and ultimate 
freedom (i.e., anti-subjectivity). Frie (2003) stated:  
From a reductionistic postmodern perspective there are only two versions of the self: the 
Cartesian conception of the self as an essential, non-relational entity, and the postmodern 
notion of the self as a social construct, embedded in relational, linguistic, and cultural 
contexts. In the process, an entire tradition of thinking about the self and subjectivity in 
terms of implicit, embodied experience, ranging from early German Romantic philosophy 
through phenomenology and modern neuroscience, is essentially ignored. (p. 16)  
 In this light, reductionist Continental conceptions of self or personhood can be seen to 
either valorize subjectivity (i.e., the definable presence of something) or anti-subjectivity (i.e., 
the absence of anything). The latter position is closest to extreme positions of postmodernism 
that herald relativism and parade the death of the self. Other conceptions that hold a social and/or 
relational conception of self do not neatly fit into any of these distinctions and are entirely 
overlooked or misunderstood (Frie, 2003; Shults, 2003). Continental philosophy, within certain 
schools, has also given birth to a social analogy of personhood, which is apparent in the 
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development of philosophical anthropology throughout the twentieth century and its impact on 
theology (Grenz, 2007; Shults, 2003).  
Theological Trinitarian Analogies 
The philosophical turn to relationality is most visible within theology in its emphasis on 
the Trinitarian nature of God that emerged near the end of the First World War (Shults, 2003). 
This emphasis has sparked a reconsideration of human nature, the idea of personhood, and 
subsequent re-conceptualizations of theological anthropology.  
Karl Barth is widely acknowledged as renewing the focus of theology on the Trinity 
(Grenz, 2001; Shults, 2003). Grenz (2001) stated, “Perhaps more consequential than the mere 
renewal of interest in the Trinitarian conception of God has been the revival of one particular 
model of the Trinity, the social analogy that has its roots in the patristic era” (p. 4). The interest 
in a social conception of the trinity has been formed in part by a broader critique of Western 
Orthodoxy (Shults, 2003). It has been charged that an overemphasis on the oneness of the 
Godhead has occurred to the detriment of its threeness, which consists of the relational nature of 
the divine (Blocher, 2009). Many contend that varieties of philosophical personalism (i.e., 
Continental schools) have actually been more influential in the development of contemporary 
Trinitarian theology than Barth’s theological formulations (Grenz, 2001; Shults, 2003). Martin 
Buber, Michael Polanyi, and John Macmurray have been some of the most influential of these 
theorists who have sought to replace the reigning individualistic notion of what it means to be a 
person with a more social definition.  
 Barth’s neo-orthodox Trinitarian position was in response to prior stances such as 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s that attempted to reconcile the criticisms of the Enlightenment with 
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traditional Protestant orthodoxy (Shults, 2003). Whereas Schleiermacher addressed the issue of 
the Trinity in the culmination of his The Christian Faith, Barth began his Church Dogmatics 
with the Trinity and in fact made it the central focus of his work. Though Schleiermacher 
focused explicitly on the topic of the Trinity later in his works, he still expounded one of the 
earliest views of relationality. Schleiermacher was considered the Father of Modern Protestant 
Theology, and his work has been considered to form the foundation of the modern field of 
hermeneutics (Richardson et al., 1999). This early form of hermeneutics is often referred to as 
romantic hermeneutics, because of its counter-Enlightenment characteristics.  
Barth’s theology was a step to extinguish these romantic influences and the general 
theological liberalism of the day and to align theology with what he considered was proper 
revelation that avoided the contamination of cultural and human ideology (Shults, 2003). Though 
he emphasized the mutual indwelling of the Godhead, as he was heavily influenced by Buber, his 
theology largely rests on a positivistic epistemological foundation of divine revelation from 
above, which tends to constrict his focus on relationality. His model certainly places greater 
emphasis on relationality than prior individual models, although the focus becomes interpersonal 
transactions or modes of relating. The necessity of relationships for appropriate human 
development is valued for the purpose of developing individuals of autonomous functioning, 
rather than deemed a continual and necessary condition for the constitution of human identity.  
Models of individual personhood tend to rely heavily on cognitive functioning, 
intelligence, and human will for the purpose of defining and perpetuating static, individual selves. 
It should also be noted that models of both subjectivity and anti-subjectivity previously discussed 
in postmodern reductionistic models also implement an individual analogy of personhood; one 
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values the definable presence of some form of independent subjectivity and the other, seemingly 
analogous position, rejects any form of defining subjectivity, which is deemed to imprison 
persons to cultural dictates (Richardson et al., 1999). Both rely upon a model of the Cartesian 
individual self regardless of the presence or absence of such a definable self.  
The second definition of relationality employs a social analogy of the Trinity that can be 
traced back to various thinkers in the patristic era (Grenz, 2001). This social analogy is also 
illustrated in the hermeneutic tradition, and is most evident in various philosophical personalisms 
(e.g., Martin Buber, Michael Polanyi, and John Macmurray). Inherent in this movement to a 
social analogy of the Trinity and subsequent conceptualizations of theological anthropology is an 
emphasis on the centrality of relationality. Not simply interpersonal relationships, but the actual 
constituting of persons by their relating to others. Models of social personhood rely heavily on 
contextual and systematic frameworks as a defining feature of development and personal identity, 
which calls for greater complexity of self-understanding, social participation, and examination of 
epistemological/ontological commitments.  
 It would be a gross misrepresentation of the field of philosophy or of theology to say that 
all have made the philosophical turn to relationality, especially as a conscious metaphysical 
commitment. In fact, it is far more common for the individual analogy of personhood to be the 
focus of relational intent and public discourse, especially since this position is in line with 
dominant cultural definitions of an individual and autonomous self. Many are arguing that 
individuals from younger generations as well as international travelers, missionaries, 
multicultural individuals, etc. are more commonly developing these distinct relational and 
identity values than did prior generations (Fowler, 1996; Kegan, 1982; 1994). Attention will now 
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be turned to psychology to examine some of the influences on the growing interest in 
relationality, and particular examples of the social analogy of personhood that are evident within 
the field of psychology.  
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Chapter 4
 
Psychological Turn to Relationality 
 
 Central to Shults’ (2003) conception of the relational turn in philosophy and theology is a 
developmental emphasis. Developmentally, many individuals are being challenged to move from 
an individual analogy of personhood with relationality viewed functionally to a social analogy of 
personhood with relationality viewed as constituting identity. Kegan (1982) argues that the 
current historical situation is an interesting one in which the majority of persons in our culture 
are being influenced to developmentally progress to an individual analogy of personhood, while 
others are being pushed even further. The latter are experiencing a developmental trend to know 
themselves, the world, and knowledge in new ways, and are conceived to identify with relational 
and social understanding out of necessity, rather than merely convenience. Person’s 
prejudgments (i.e., worldviews) function as guiding structures that both define and facilitate the 
use of varying epistemological methodologies (Shults, 2003). In other words, the knower’s 
methodological faith informs what they can and cannot know both about the world and 
themselves. Kegan intended for the model to highlight the cultural pressure to conceptualize 
simultaneously present relational values as two polarized and competing ideological positions 
(i.e., value for dualism). He did not intend for his final stage, which incorporates a social analogy 
of personhood, to be seen as the ultimate developmental achievement for everyone, but rather a 
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distinction for those who have developed different relational and anthropological values out of 
social and cultural necessity. 
 The relational turn and its value for a social analogy of personhood is not synonymous 
with an Eastern conception of self or higher consciousness nor with an extreme postmodern 
position of multiple selves. Both attempt to entirely displace or eliminate the illusion of a static 
and individual self (Safran & Muran, 2000). Eastern positions do so by considering the transient 
experience of the self as entirely a process rather than a distinct entity. The goal in such 
psychological models is focused on the capacity to let go and simply be. In postmodern theories, 
the emphasis is on the existence of multiple selves and the death of the individual self, and 
related psychological models seek resolution in defining and entirely creating one’s reality 
through linguistic and narrative formulations (Held, 1995).  
 The relational turn in psychology encompasses greater ontological considerations, rather 
than simply and primarily focusing on epistemological commitments. None of these perspectives 
necessarily entail the rejection of all epistemological commitments, the impossibility of truth, or 
the impracticability of searching for truth, but they do require greater specificity, especially in 
regards to social, cultural, and historical identifications and their impact on individual identity 
and methodological practice.  
 Just as the relational turn in philosophy and theology is not an altogether new 
development, the same can be said for relational emphases in the field of psychology (Shults, 
2003). Many have held such relational and sociocultural values in large part because of their 
connections with Continental forms of thought and philosophy (Gergen, 2009; Kirschner & 
Martin, 2010). Kirschner & Martin (2010) stated, “Indeed, a long line of Anglo-American and 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     24 
 
Continental thinkers have held that our social relations with others have primacy with respect to 
our psychological existence, being an indispensably necessary source for our thinking about the 
world and ourselves” (p. 3). They listed many individuals who held such values and were 
formative in the development of psychology and the social sciences including Wilhelm Wundt, 
James Mark Baldwin, Heinze Werner, Pierre Janet, Lev Vygotsky, George Herbert Mead, John 
Dewey, and Charles Cooley.  
 Development of the relational and sociocultural approaches has languished in psychology 
more so than other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and various philosophical 
branches (Kirschner & Martin, 2010). Purification of the field of psychology in the late 20th 
century and early 21st century involved purging metaphysical questioning, whether it was 
philosophical or religious in nature. Much of the relational and sociocultural values inherent to 
the founders of the discipline of psychology went unnoticed, were explicitly devalued, or were 
entirely lost in the translations that persisted (Kegan, 1982). A number of factors within the 
discipline of psychology may now be contributing to the increase in relational and sociocultural 
considerations.  
Possible Causes for Relational Turn 
 The identification of psychology as a natural science and its continued development as a 
unified discipline is perhaps one of the most influential reasons why relationality is becoming 
increasingly more popular. The provision of scientific knowledge into direct clinical care of 
clients has been a perpetual source of frustration in the pursuit of a coherent disciplinary identity, 
and is also visible in the struggle to prove the effectiveness of various psychological theories 
(Held 1995). Clinical practice has often been considered merely an application of research, and 
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has struggled to develop a distinct professional identity of its own (Slife, 2004). Many are 
turning to alternative philosophies of science, more adaptable meta-frameworks, and expanding 
their scientific, philosophical, and theoretical methodologies in an attempt to integrate various 
ways of knowing and to account for what they perceive as the divide between science and 
practice (Bernstein, 2010; Gergen, 2009; Held, 2007; Kirschner & Martin, 2010; Richardson et 
al., 1999).   
 A general loss of confidence and interest in the predictive and explanatory power of 
psychological theories has also occurred as psychology has increasingly aligned itself with 
biological models of health and industry (Held, 1995). Empirically validated treatments tend to 
valorize objective scientific findings, while negating theory to metaphysical speculation at worst 
and an unaffordable luxury at best. Theoretical, meta-theoretical, and philosophical 
considerations are often deemed irrelevant in a scientific culture propelled by such rigorous 
analytical thinking, which leaves little room for critical thinking and personal reflection 
(Kirschner, 2005a, 2005b; Slife, 2004; Slife, Reber, &Richardson, 2005).  
Held (1995) stated that the eclectic and integrative movements that were spurned in the 
1980s and 1990s were a result of the loss of confidence in the ability of any one theoretical 
system to explain all of psychological reality. Two related concerns developed: Misgivings that 
results can be replicated across individuals who differ widely in personal and social-cultural 
characteristics, and distrust in the related theoretical conceptualization. Together, these doubts 
resulted in the implementation of interventions at the symptom level. Over the past few decades 
a simultaneous shift has occurred toward research on the therapeutic relationship, the 
characteristics and abilities of successful therapists, and therapeutic outcomes in applied/clinical 
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settings (Duncan et al., 2009; Norcross, 2002). With the loss of confidence in theory and recent 
trends in therapeutic research, many have turned their focus towards the centrality of relationship 
in the delivery of psychological services. 
 Others contend that the loss of interest in theoretical explanation can best be seen in the 
development of many pragmatic relational theories or therapies (Bernstein, 2010; Slife, 2004). A 
growing interest in pragmatism may also be a contributing factor to the increase in relational 
perspectives, which are clearly evident in a revival of classical American pragmatism, neo-
pragmatism, some hermeneutic variations, and some constructivist-culturalist schools (Bernstein, 
2010; Wertz, 1999). In such models that value practice over theory, research on common factors 
and/or the centrality of the therapeutic relationship often becomes the foundation for both 
delivery of psychological services and treatment conceptualization.  
Psychology’s separation from philosophy has created a dilemma that runs to the core of 
the field’s identity and struggle with defining a philosophy of science. A coherent philosophy of 
science is paramount for the various theories of unification proposed for the future of the field of 
psychology (Magnavita, 2008; Sternberg, 2005). The historical severance of relationship with 
philosophy has contributed to psychology's struggle to make sense of its own theories, confusion 
over metaphysical commitments, and tendency to polarize problems into neatly defined dualisms 
(e.g., modern and postmodern debate; Miller, 1992; Richardson et al., 1999). A distorted 
scientific vision and identity for the discipline of psychology is often unknowingly perpetuated. 
The result is that psychology struggles to account for the strengths and limitations of its own 
methodologies, value commitments, and social influence. Many seek models or theories that 
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account for moral and ethical considerations, but fail to consider their essential scientific 
philosophy (Slife, 2004).  
 Managed care organizations have increasingly demanded that psychologists and their 
interventions be effective and efficient, hence pragmatic. A market for evidenced based practices 
has grown, although this serves to perpetuate an over-identification with a scientific identity for 
much of the discipline, rather than for just those facets and contexts that neatly fit such service 
delivery. In many sectors, professional psychology is clinging to the medical establishment in 
order to sustain a viable scientific presence in a culture that values quick symptom relief and 
medication prescriptions, and is fueled by an economy of insurance reimbursement. Many 
psychologists struggle to deliver what they feel is ethical and effective treatment in light of such 
professional and economical pressures, and are disillusioned with these restrictions. Relational 
emphases, at an interpersonal level, often allow an avenue for providing psychological services 
in what many consider a humane manner that is personally meaningful for the clinician, while 
also addressing the disillusionment many clients have had with the prior medical treatment of 
their ailments.  
Inter-disciplinary fertilization has also played a role in the focus on relationality within 
psychology (Gergen, 2009). Fields such as social constructivism, ethnomethodology, cultural 
anthropology, and philosophical anthropology have highlighted the need for greater 
anthropological specificity in the social sciences (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 
1985; Gergen, 2009). Sociology and pedagogy in particular have had a significant influence 
(Gergen, 2009). Many also contend that a relational turn is occurring across other fields as 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     28 
 
diverse as nursing, international relations, economic geography, pedagogy, philosophy, and 
theology (Gergen, 2009; Kirschner & Martin, 2010; Shults, 2003).  
 Various cultural influences within multiculturalism, cultural psychology, and cross-
cultural psychology highlight the significance of relationships for various populations globally, 
while simultaneously critiquing the North American psychological paradigm and its history 
(Brock, 2006; Christopher, 2001; Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Gergen, 2009; Qureshi, 2005). 
Postmodern critiques of the modern scientific endeavor in psychology have often used 
multicultural platforms as a vehicle for pluralism. They have left lingering questions surrounding 
the role of social and cultural factors in human development and identity formation, the 
inescapable moral ideologies undergirding psychological theories, the social embeddedness of 
scientific methodologies, the neglect of human agency, and the attention placed on systems and 
economies of power (Held, 1995). 
 Infant researchers, neuroscientists, developmental theorists, and feminist theorists stress 
the necessity of relationality for growth, maturation, and identity formation (Gilligan, 1993; 
Jordan, 2010a, 2010b; Kegan, 1982, 1994; Richardson & Fowers, 1996). Many point to the 
growth of feminist values as a factor promoting relational development and identity formation 
that have become a discipline-wide emphasis (Gergen, 2009; Gilligan, 1993; Jordan, 2010a). 
Research exploring the biological and neurological development that are mediated by 
relationships has increased over the past decade (Beebe & Lachmann, 2003), especially as 
neuropsychology continues to develop as a distinct facet of psychology. 
 Relational variations of cognitive and cognitive behavioral therapies have increased since 
the early 1980s following the introduction of constructivist influences. Relational emphases have 
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continued to expand with the recent introduction of third wave contributions (Gilbert & Leahy, 
2007; Lambert & Simon, 2010; Neimeyer & Raskin, 2001). Neimeyer and Raskin (2001) 
explored the influence of many of these models on psychology; they stated, “A middle road…is 
provided by a focus on the centrality of human relationships, the dialogical context in which 
storied accounts are actually related and identities enacted in our daily lives” (p. 412-413). 
Gilbert and Leahy (2007) explored a number of different currents within CBT that highlight the 
significance of the therapeutic relationship, including common factors research, increased 
attention to emotion in CBT, social cognition, recognizing and resolving therapeutic ruptures, 
compassion, attachment theory, difficult populations, DBT, ACT, supervision, and pedagogical 
considerations.  
 Within diverse depth psychologies, theoretical formulations have moved to encompass 
increasingly varied relational and contextual implications in the clinical treatment of patients 
(e.g., attachment theory, relational psychoanalytic theories, intersubjectivity, interpersonal theory, 
phenomenology, existentialism; Aron, 1996; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 1988; 
Reynolds, 2007; Teyber, 2006; Wachtel, 1997, 2008).  
 It is relatively easy to locate broad relational interests and changes within the field of 
psychology. But differentiating between the two relational veins, an individual analogy and a 
social analogy, is often more difficult. Tracing the history of relational terminology first within 
early psychoanalysis, and then how it has developed since that time, may help to distinguish 
between the two relational definitions.  
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Relational Turn in Psychoanalysis 
 The phrase the relational turn was originally used to connote a shift within 
psychoanalytic theories nearly thirty years ago during the early 1980’s (Greenberg & Mitchell, 
1983), although relational emphases can be seen within psychoanalysis prior to this time. One of 
the first to emphasize relational considerations was Sandor Ferenczi in the early twentieth 
century when he disagreed with Freud’s classical orthodoxy of intrapsychic conflict and instead 
posited that deficits in a client’s early environment were of greater importance and impact 
(Reynolds, 2007). Other analysts attempted to incorporate social considerations into Freudian 
psychoanalysis, although the classical drive model would continue to persist as the dominant 
tradition. 
 The relational terminology was used as a result of the growing gap between classical 
Freudian models and the interpersonal tradition developed by Harry Stack Sullivan (Greenberg 
& Mitchell, 1983). The term object relations was no longer able to contain the diversification 
and growth of numerous theories and neither was the term interpersonal able to accurately 
portray what these theorists believed. Aron (1996) stated: 
The central objection to the word interpersonal was that it had unfortunately come to 
connote only external relationships between real people; the analytic position that was 
being developed by this new group, however, emphasized not only external interpersonal 
relations but intrapsychic, internal, fantasized, and imaginary relations. (p. 13)  
 Since this time, most psychoanalytic schools are increasingly becoming less drive-oriented 
and are taking on relational values for various social, clinical, cultural, and scientific reasons 
(Levenson, 1995). It is not uncommon for relational theories to either be posited in complete 
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opposition to classical Freudian psychoanalysis or in absolute disregard for all prior intrapsychic 
conceptions and to move in the direction that classical theory is perceived to have failed to 
account for (Aron, 1996; Mitchell, 1988; Willock, 2007), and they are often offered as 
alternative comprehensive systems, rather than partial replacements or particular solutions. 
Relational theories are often accused of taking the extreme stance of cultural determinism, 
although many are attempting to avoid both biological and cultural determinism (Wachtel, 2008).  
 Relational terminology is often used to describe both a broader encompassing theoretical 
framework as well as to identify the many specific individual relational theories (Aron & Harris, 
2005; Wachtel, 2008). Psychoanalysis has developed numerous schools of thought much like 
Continental philosophy, in part due to its lack of commitment to any one methodological 
framework. Interest in relationality has grown to the point that distinguishing between individual 
relational theories has become exceedingly difficult. Numerous psychoanalytic traditions have 
been reinterpreted through a plurality of perspectives influenced by different schools of thought 
including contemporary hermeneutics, postmodernism, poststructuralism, social constructionism, 
and varieties of feminism (Mitchell & Black, 1995). This is especially noticeable in American 
relational theories, which have taken on a philosophical form due to the emphasis in American 
culture to either identify with positivism or postmodernism (Taub, 2009).  
 There are a number of opinions on why the relational turn occurred in psychoanalysis. 
Greenberg (2001) proposed that in many ways the relational turn grew out of critique of a rigidly 
fixed standard or framework for technique and treatment that was carried over from classical 
Freudian influences (i.e., biological determinism). In classical analysis (i.e., one person 
psychology), the therapist is pictured as a blank slate that is neither personally transparent nor 
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emotionally available to the client. Beebee and Lachman (2003) believe that dividing 
psychoanalysis into a dichotomy of frame maintaining versus frame breaking models is 
oversimplified. They suggested that the relational turn is partially a means of seeking an 
expanded theory of interaction that accounts for systemic considerations, which have developed 
in infant research in regards to contextualizing personality and biological development. Wachtel 
(2008) also stressed the need for systemic contextualization of multiple variables.   
 One of the most common ways the relational turn has been talked about within 
psychoanalysis has been through the terms one-person and two-person psychologies (Starks, 
1999; Wachtel, 2008). One-person psychology typically refers to theories and therapies that 
focus exclusively on the intrapsychic structure of the client with little attention to environmental 
influences. In this model, the person is treated as an isolated mind from which their issues arise. 
Two-person psychology typically refers to a wider perspective, which postulates that clients are 
constituted in and through their relationships, both in the developmental past and the here-and-
now, rather than merely developing in the past via the influence of relationships on the 
development of their individual minds. It is not uncommon to conceive of one person and two 
person psychologies as a continuum with varying degrees; many hold that no clinician actually 
works entirely on any one end of the continuum (Starks, 1999; Wachtel, 2008).  
 In a two-person psychology the therapist is viewed as an actual “other” who has 
significant influence on the client, and no longer is the goal of the therapist to be a detached, 
objective investigator attempting to discover the issues or problems within the isolated mind of 
the client. A two-person psychology posits that the mind is interactive and that it is motivated to 
seek contact and engagement with other minds (Mitchell, 1988). Contact, engagement, and 
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interaction in the therapeutic relationship become an important piece of the two-person 
psychology. Wachtel (2008) described it as “an approach to psychotherapy in which the fact that 
it is a conversation- rather than a one-sided examination of one person by another- is at the very 
heart of how the therapist understands what she is up to” (p. 9). The most significant difference 
in how clinicians actually practice is not whether drives (i.e., intrapsychic commitments) or 
relationships (i.e., interpersonal commitments) are deemed the foundation of personality but how 
the actual structuring of personality is viewed over time (i.e., the reciprocity or relationship of 
intrapsychic, interpersonal, and environmental variables).  
 Two commitments undergird most relational theories: Value for context and an interest in 
the impact on and actual constitutive nature of relationships on mental life (Wachtel, 2008). 
These specific values align with a social analogy of personhood that has previously been 
described. Viewing the history and development of this specific use of relational terminology in 
relational theories in psychoanalysis helps to distinguish it from its broader emphasis as a general 
interest. This same distinction will now be examined within the field of psychology.  
Relational Ontology and Middle Ground Theories 
 Relational ontology. Slife (2004) espoused a relational ontology for psychology that 
may prove helpful in further clarifying relational veins within psychology. His model is 
compared against the dominant abstractionist ontology that is the dominant model for the field of 
psychology. He illuminates the values of both abstractionist and ontological positions through a 
continuum of weak to strong variations of relationality.  
 Weak relationality is conceived as a type of individualism or atomism, which is apparent 
in models of change that require the internalization of outside influences (Slife, 2004). Persons, 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     34 
 
places, things, and practices are considered self-contained entities that receive information from 
the outside. Interaction in such a model is defined as the degree to which individuals act on one 
another or influence what is on the inside of the other.  
 Strong relationality is conceived as an ontological relationality, which is apparent in 
models of change that emphasize the quality of relating and the resulting constitution of 
individuals (Slife, 2004). Persons, places, things, and practices are considered to have a shared 
being and a mutual constitution as information is reciprocally determined. Practices are elevated 
because they require the continual assessment of the relationship with current context, prior 
actions of oneself and others, and future expectations for how those practices will continue to 
inform the relationship and those involved in it. In a weak relationality, practices are abstracted 
and objectified or are considered to transcend the relationships of which they are a part. In a 
strong relationality, practices are constituted by and dependent on various factors and are 
therefore fluid as contexts change. Interaction in such a model is defined as a dialogical 
enterprise in which the relationship that develops between individuals is a distinct entity from the 
individual mentalities of either participant. Such exchanges rely upon a systemic consideration of 
multiple levels of meaning at any given time (i.e., isomorphism), which values attention to 
process rather relying on causal determinants.  
 Both weak and strong relationalities value the ability to implement abstraction, although 
a value for abstractionism becomes an ontology when this position is the most fundamental mode 
of relating to reality (Slife, 2004). An abstractionist ontology is apparent in psychology’s value 
for methodologies, therapeutic techniques, theories, and ethical codes. There are an increasing 
number of areas within psychology that clearly convey values for practical two person 
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psychologies, expanding metaphysical considerations, or hold commitments to strong 
ontological relational positions. Beyond the psychoanalytic relational theories already described, 
several other theories that favor philosophical discourse will be focused on here as they are most 
clearly recognizable.  
 Middle ground theories. Held (2007) distinguished a broad band of theorists who are 
seeking to cultivate greater and more fertile middle ground between modern and postmodern 
dichotomies: Neo-hermeneutists, neo-pragmatists, and moderate social constructivists. They 
share two common commitments. First, they seek an alternative beyond absolute positions of 
objectivism and relativism. Secondly, they accept some form or definition of the interpretive 
turn as a plausible and worthy epistemological and ontological alternative for the social or 
human sciences (Bohman et al., 1991). Martin and Sugarman (2009) described middle ground 
stances as, “an ontological and epistemological combination that resists both postmodern 
relativism and modern essentialism, because it understands psychological kinds as constitutively 
dependent on sociocultural and discursive practices and contexts that both enable and constrain 
them” (p. 121).  
 Kirschner and Martin (2010) also examined a number of theoretical and philosophical 
approaches that espoused distinctively sociocultural emphases: Discursive and constructionist 
approaches, hermeneutic approaches, dialogical approaches, and neo-Vygotskian approaches. 
Sociocultural approaches have been nurtured by deep continental roots and hold as a central 
value a social analogy of personhood. Kirschner (2005a) stated: 
There are distinctions to be made, to be sure, between cultural psychological, relational, 
dialogical, narrative, discursive, hermeneutic, and critical psychological approaches. But 
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if you will permit me some lumping and generalizing in this context, then I will 
underscore that these are, by and large, meaning-centered, contextualist (but still 
attempting to leave room for agency), and anti-reductionist frameworks that consider 
cultural realities to be as real as material realities. In truth, they go farther than this, for 
they consider objective reality to be mediated through cultural frames. (p. 9)  
Polkinghorne (1990) contended that there are two general reconstructive trends that 
attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the postmodern deconstructive epistemological positions within 
psychology, while seeking to expand the dominant modern foundationalist perspective. The first 
type of response retains some commitment to a type of universal reason that serves as a vehicle 
for grounding statements. The second type of response re-examines ontology; it employs 
hermeneutic rationality as the principal means by which humans understand reality. Both types 
of reconstructive responses attempt to offer the possibility of a different guiding framework for 
psychological inquiry by exploring alternate logics and forms of reason, and are often broadly 
referred to as post-positivist psychologies. Implicitly, and often explicitly, these theorists are 
placing increased emphasis on ontological considerations without condoning or supporting 
epistemological positions of relativism.  
These are just a few of the areas in psychology that are grappling with ontological 
relational values. Regardless of what ontology is emphasized all ontologies imply or assume 
basic ethical values and establish a moral framework for the discipline (Slife, 2004). One of the 
greatest contributions of the psychological turn to relationality is an emphasis on the awareness 
of such ontological realities via broader philosophical considerations. This paper does not deny 
the need for abstraction nor the value of epistemological methodologies within psychology. 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     37 
 
However, the relational turn allows expansion of ontological considerations, while also 
providing a means of practically implementing philosophical discourse back into the heart of 
psychology. The relational turn also supports a number of richer and more specific contributions 
to the integration of psychology and Christianity. It is to this topic we now turn.  
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Chapter 5
 
Integration 
 
 In prior sections, the history and influence of Continental philosophy was outlined to 
illuminate the presence of multiple values for relationality in philosophy, theology, and 
psychology. Due to underlying anthropological assumptions, these variations of relationality 
hold very different implications for the task of integration. Theological anthropology will be 
examined here to illuminate both current ontological values within integration and the alternative 
perspectives that contemporary ontological relational values have to offer to integration.  
Imago Dei 
 An individual analogy of personhood often drives the structural, functional, and relational 
conceptions of imago Dei (McMinn & Campbell, 2007; Shults, 2003). The central driving 
question for these theological anthropologies is focused on the number of substances that 
constitute a person. The relational dimension that has become popular in the past few decades, 
which heralds human rational and volitional capacities, espouses individuality, fits with a 
positivist philosophy of science, and appears practically as a form of interpersonalism.  
 Commitments to an individual analogy of personhood often result in a failure to take into 
account how conceptualizations of the imago Dei have actually developed historically (Shults, 
2003). Underscoring this history relinquishes the categories from a strictly modern interpretation, 
which tends to view them as distinct, but overlapping categories or substances that need to be 
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integrated. Viewing them historically also allows the illumination of current changes that are 
occurring within contemporary theology and theological anthropology that are a direct result of 
the impact of social analogies of personhood.  
 By far the oldest and most typical way of conceiving the image of God has been through 
structural or substantive considerations. This is typically apparent through the focus on image or 
likeness, and follows the long tradition of substance metaphysics that asks what persons are 
made of and how this is related to God. 
 The emergence of the historical-critical method of biblical scholarship in the late 19th 
century shed light on how language and culture can be accounted for in the interpretation of 
scripture (Shults, 2003). The discovery of the Babylonian creation myth called the Enuma Elish 
in 1876 highlighted the similarities between Jewish creation accounts and their captors’ myths. 
This led to skepticism concerning the sole focus on structural considerations. The resulting 
emphasis on language and culture shifted the focus of the Imago Dei from explaining personal 
constitution in relation to God to understanding how that divine constitution was to be lived out 
for God’s purposes. This was typically expressed in the role or function of humanity in dominion 
over and in stewardship of the earth. 
 The third development of the imago Dei gradually shifted emphasis from the first parents 
of creation (i.e., Adam and Eve in the creation story) to an acknowledgment of the 
transhistorical presents (Shults, 2003). This emphasis was advanced by the development of 
social analogies of personhood discussed earlier in this paper that took form following the First 
World War. The human condition for the first time in history was conceived as being accessible 
and intelligible by the present context and ongoing relationship of creation to creator. This 
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existential model of the imago Dei is often called relational due to its focus on both the here-
and-now and its value for the social interaction of individual persons. 
 Some contend that a fourth category of the imago Dei is present and currently developing 
further (Grenz, 2001; Shults, 2003). This is considered to be an eschatological imago Dei that 
emphasizes not only the abstract temporal mode of future but also the absolute future of God’s 
reign that has arrived and will continue to arrive. Greater emphasis in this model of the imago 
Dei is placed on considering the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Father and the Son. 
Structural, functional, and relational versions have tended to place greater emphasis on the work 
of the Father and/or Son thus far. Many theologians such as Wolfhart Pannenberg, Stanley Grenz, 
and Jurgen Moltmann who espouse the eschatological image of God tend to value the social 
analogy of personhood that moves away from a sole reliance on substance metaphysics and a 
psychology of the individual self (Shults, 2003). In this light, persons are viewed systemically as 
both having a distinct identity and yet continually being constituted by their relating to others 
and God (i.e., substance-in-relation). Being formed into the image of the Son involves reaching 
out to that which is beyond one’s self (i.e., transcendence). Inherent in this imago Dei is an 
emphasis on process and transformation via the shaping and constituting of persons by their 
relationships, traditions, and communities.  
Ontological Considerations in Integration 
Current means of integrating psychology and Christianity tend to rely exclusively on an 
individual analogy of personhood as this is most directly applicable to the scientific enterprise, 
which rests upon a number of assumptions including the distinct separation of theory and 
philosophy from scientific methodologies, hard distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, 
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exclusive reliance on substance metaphysics, and a conception of the self as a static, individual, 
and autonomous agent.  
For example, Van Leeuwen (1988) used relational anthropology to explore the stance of 
Christian psychologists within the two cultures of contemporary academic psychology, one 
positivist and scientistic and the other post-positivist and humanistic. On closer inspection, her 
use of relational terminology is in line with an individual analogy of personhood. Other 
integrationists have also called for a more intentional consideration of philosophical, 
anthropological, and scientific methodological commitments, which have paralleled general 
trends in the philosophy of science across various disciplines over the past few decades (Bouma-
Prediger, 1990; Evans, 1976; Hill, 1989; Jones, 1994; Wolterstorff, 1984).  
Distinguishing between relational definitions becomes important when considering such 
proposals, which often rely upon unexamined ontological assumptions. Expanding ontological 
considerations in integration can be a fruitful and enriching endeavor—one that necessarily 
expands how we think about ourselves as well as our practice, and has the potential to create 
space for the variety of metaphysical positions inherent to religious and spiritual concerns. The 
potential benefits of ontological considerations in integration will now be explored.  
 Making room for multiple analogies of personhood allows for greater developmental 
sensitivity in theoretical and clinical pursuits. Posing a social analogy of personhood in 
philosophy, theology, and psychology is not intended to supplant the dominant individual 
analogy of personhood, although a number of persons in our culture (e.g., international travelers, 
missionaries, younger generations) are being pressed by social and cultural factors (e.g., 
globalization, international travel, acculturation) to identify primarily with a social analogy of 
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personhood. Typically, this social analogy is conceived in our culture as being a conscious and 
rational decision, an unexamined assumption, or even an outright rebellious position; it is 
deemed synonymous with postmodern sensibilities and must therefore reflect some form of 
commitment to a philosophical position of relativism (Shults, 2003). From a developmental 
perspective these changes in anthropological values can be better understood for what they 
actually mean to those individuals, to our culture, and to the work of integration. Ultimately, 
understanding both analogies of personhood allows for greater developmental sensitivity, which 
has the potential to translate into increased effectiveness of services, greater understanding of 
relational identification processes, and richer models of development into spiritual and 
psychological maturity.  
For example, holding an individual analogy of personhood to be foundational requires 
that identity and development are conceived from an internal perspective that is influenced from 
the outside, which considers relationships as being secondary to others and that knowledge and 
experience are to be internalized for one to develop. Holding a social analogy of personhood to 
be foundational will conceive of identity and development from a transitional position that both 
values internal identity and the actual relating of it to external factors.  
Personal identity in this model is conceived as a process continually in motion, rather 
than a static position. Such a process may best be conceptualized as a systemic model of personal 
adaptability. Relationships, particularly defined by their quality, are considered to actually 
constitute and significantly contribute to the identity of persons. Both of these positions carry 
very different developmental assumptions, which can be simultaneously valued and intentionally 
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considered in the treatment of individuals from varying positions. Few models of spiritual and 
psychological maturity have yet been developed with a social analogy of personhood in mind.  
 A social analogy of personhood places greater emphasis not only on development and 
relational models, but on process as well. Historically, most theoretical-conceptual models of 
integration have tended to be categorical in nature distinguishing distinct modes or types of 
integration (Carter, 1977; Carter & Narramore, 1979), which emphasize epistemological 
considerations. Several models have expressed the importance of addressing applied integration 
and the personal development and character of the integrationist (Bouma-Prediger, 1990; 
Bufford, 1997; Tan, 2001). Even fewer have ventured to describe integration as a process 
(Brown, 2004; Hall & Porter, 2004; Hathaway, 2002, 2004). This emphasis on process within the 
relational turn has a tendency to encourage an eschatological conception of imago Dei, and has 
the potential to expand current ways of conceptualizing spiritual formation. This emphasis is 
visible in several areas including disciplines for the individual (Coe, 2000;Willard 1998, 2000, 
2002), an affective and moral basis for spiritual transformation (Leffel, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c), 
and direction for the spiritual director (Hardy, 2000).  
The Holy Spirit is underrepresented as a topic in integration, as well as in theology in 
general. The role of the Holy Spirit could naturally be further explored by relational, 
eschatological, and process oriented perspectives (Fowler, 1996; Grenz, 2001; Jones, 2003; 
Sandage & Shults, 2006; 2007; Shults, 2003). Sandage and Shults (2006) stated that there is a 
current need to re-conceptualize pneumatology in light of changing relational values. Integration 
of eastern and western theological perspectives has also been at a standstill in much of the 
literature due to an over-emphasis on epistemological positions, which can easily be expanded by 
The Psychological Turn to Relationality     44 
 
consideration of simultaneous relational ontological values (Jones, 2003; Lowery, 2006).  
 Little emphasis has been placed on social and cultural perspectives within integration 
(Dueck, 1989;Dueck & Parsons, 2004; Dueck & Reimer, 2009; McNeil, 2005). This is also 
visible in the absence of focus on missiology in the integration literature (Adams, Shaver, & 
White, 2003; Hall & Schram, 1999). Sociocultural considerations in integration have the 
potential to be exponentially increased with the introduction of ontological relational 
considerations. This is in part due to the value in a social analogy of personhood that entirely 
escaping one’s worldview values in order to be entirely objective, whether they are historical, 
cultural, traditional, or personal, is both an impossibility and a misdirected goal in and of itself 
(Shults, 2003). Such sociocultural considerations may also help to foster greater awareness of 
when implicit American values are unknowingly paraded under the banner of Christianity, 
resulting in the encouragement of other indigenous forms of psychology and integration.  
 The examination of personal values of the integrationist is inherent to the use of 
ontological hermeneutics. Hermeneutics has been a topic of concern within integration literature 
for some time, although little development of ontological hermeneutics has been applied to 
current modes of conceptualization or practice (Jones, 2008; Richardson, 2006a, 2006b). 
Contemporary relational psychoanalysis is experiencing a resurgence of interest especially in 
many Christian circles (Hall, 2007; Hill & Hall, 2002; Hoffman, 2011; Jones, 1996; Jones, 2008; 
Sorenson, 2004; Stevens, 2006; Strawn & Brown, 2004); many of these individuals hold or 
promote various ontological hermeneutic meta-frameworks. 
Ontological relational considerations might contribute to a more balanced view of science 
for integration, one that accounts for its strengths and limitations, implements philosophical 
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reflection, explores moral and cultural ethics, and addresses the growing gap between science 
and practice. Such considerations help practice to be considered a valid facet of the discipline, 
rather than merely an abstraction (Slife, 2004).  
 Relational theories and conceptualizations of integration are becoming popular (Hoffman, 
2011; Olthuis, 2006; Sandage & Shults, 2006, 2007; Sorenson, 2004, Strawn, 2007). Viewing 
both relational anthropologies side by side also serves as an interpretive lens for the current field 
of integration in that it distinguishes between different usages and assumptions of relational 
terminology. Shults (2003) stated, “The point is that individuals with traditionalist or modernist 
fiduciary structures may talk about relational concepts but put them to use in the service of 
constructing a less complex methodological faith, which makes them prone to misunderstanding” 
(p. 48). Making sense of the countless relational theories is not an easy task, especially without 
the help of philosophical and anthropological tools. 
Relational conceptualizations of integration are increasingly promoting a value for 
quality of relationships (Lowery, 2006). Several areas of interest have resulted, including those 
that emphasize the value of community (Grenz, 2001; Lowery, 2006; Slife, 2004), inheritance of 
Christian traditions (Jones, 2008), love (Hansen & Drovdahl, 2006; Holley, 2006; Olthuis, 2006; 
Watson, 2000), and forgiveness (Jones, 1995; Sandage, 2005; Shults & Sandage, 2003). All of 
these topics could contribute to increased integration of contemporary Trinitarian theology with 
psychological models of human development. Such endeavors would fill a dismaying gap that 
exists in congregational knowledge of normal healthy psychological growth.  
Individual analogies of personhood have relied on a causal template in explaining human 
action that values the internal mental world as the source of all individual action, which can 
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easily slip into biological determinism (Gergen, 2009). Extreme social analogies run the risk of 
promoting sociocultural determinism if taken too far, although they offer promise for providing 
models of human agency as well as expanded understanding of embodiment (Frie, 1997, 2003; 
Welton, 1999; Willard, 2002). Social analogies of personhood attempt to overcome various 
dualisms that are inherent to individual analogies such as subjective and objective, self and other, 
substance and relations, spirit and body. In a social analogy, persons are conceived as 
“substances-in-relation”, which requires the integral participation and inclusion of an 
individuals’ body (Lowery, 2006). The body is conceived to be the means by which individuals 
actually grow and develop into psychologically and spiritually mature persons (Willard, 2002).  
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Chapter 6
 
Conclusion 
 
A general relational turn that rests upon an individual analogy of personhood has been 
illuminated in philosophy, theology, and psychology, and a more specific relational turn that 
rests on a social analogy of personhood has also been described. These general and specific 
relational turns are often described as being largely distinct, although in reality they overlap to a 
great extent (Kegan, 1982; Shults, 2003). Individuals will often more readily identify with one or 
the other position, while cultural pressures promote polarization of them into opposing 
ideological positions. Such pressures are currently apparent in modern and postmodern 
commitments as well (Dueck & Parsons, 2004), but it would be a mistake to reduce the relational 
turn into modern and postmodern epistemological positions. Understanding that a social analogy 
of personhood exists does not require commitment to it values, nor should it be perceived as 
developmentally superior to prior individual values. And it certainly does not propose the 
acceptance of epistemological relativism. The rich philosophical inheritance of the relational turn 
traced back to Continental influences in the first section of this paper helped to distinguish these 
philosophical distinctions.  
Understanding the existence of a social analogy of personhood within theology in the 
second section of this paper helped to qualify the importance and necessity of seriously 
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considering anthropological assumptions and their generalizability into diverse fields and 
perspectives.  
Identifying interest in and potential causes of relational trends within the field of 
psychology in the third section of this paper helped to more precisely distinguish between a 
general and more specific relational turns that are simultaneously occurring in our culture. 
Examining these relational turns illuminated their potential impact for the field of psychology, 
which allowed for the reconsideration of the necessity of philosophical reflection for the field of 
psychology, which has historically been undervalued. 
It remains to be seen how interest in relationality will continue to unfold within the field 
of psychology or within integration for that matter. For the time being, consideration of the 
relational turn in the task of integration in section four provided a much-needed vantage point to 
consider shifting cultural values. Some of the most important implications for integration 
included increased developmental sensitivity to identity formation, emphasis on models of 
process, consideration of the role of the Holy Spirit, expansion of sociocultural models, and a 
defining value for human agency. 
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